THE MILKMAN RINGS TWICE:
HAS PAUL V. UNITED STATES GIVEN FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS THE FORCE
OF STATUTORY LAW?
JoHN R.

DONNELLY*

Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in Paul v. United States,' stated
in 1963:
The earlier Regulation further stated that federal procurement officers should not
require suppliers to comply with state price-fixing laws before it was judicially determined
whether the latter were applicable to government contracts, 2 a provision which the Court
said manifested a federal "hands off" policy respecting minimum price laws of the States.
The present Regulation makes no such allowances, contains no such qualifications and
provides for no such exception. Its unqualified command is that purchases for the Armed
Services be made on a competitive basis; and it has, of course, the force of law....
Justice Douglas has not changed his opinion since twenty years ago, when he
wrote for the minority in Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission:
A regulation which interprets "impracticable" so as not to preclude competitive bidding
because of state price-fixing stays well within the scope of the rule-making power. These
War Department regulations accordingly "have the force of law.

. . ."

Their application

in this case therefore has no less force and effect than if it was specifically directed by
Congress....
What has changed in the intervening twenty years (apart from the decision of
the Supreme Court) has not been the federal procurement policy as expressed by
congressional statute, for even Justice Douglas admits the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947' simply revised and restated the time tested policy of competitive
bidding, but the administrative regulations of one of the multitudinous federal
agencies which engage in federal procurement. Does this changed regulation have
the full force of statutory law? Can one federal agency by changing its regulations
change the federal law? Suppose one federal agency-National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), for example-which uses the Department of Defense
*A.B. 194o, Duke University; LL.B. 1947, Columbia University. Major, USAF, Chief Counsel's
Office, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Huntsville,
Ala. Formerly Staff Judge Advocate, Space Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command.
The views expressed herein are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the official views of any
government agency.
1 371 U.S. 245 (1963).
'Id. at 254 (citing Penn Dairies, Inc. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 276, 278 (1943)).
'Id. at 255 (citing Public Utilities Comm'n of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 542-43
(1958). (Emphasis added.)
'3N8 U.S. 261, 284.
5 62 Stat. 21 (1948), as amended, 70 Stat. 130 (X958), 1o U.S.C.A. § 2301-14 (1962).
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(DOD) promulgated Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) under
certain conditions and writes its own regulations under others, adopts conflicting
regulations, which one is the supreme law of the land? And does saying that these
regulations apply as though specifically directed by Congress mean that the ASPR,
with all its standard clauses, has become in effect a basic agreement for all government
contractors, regardless of contractual agreement?
I
COURT OF CLAIMS INTERPRETATION OF PAUL V. UNITED STATESREGULATIONS APPLIED LIKE STATUTES

The Court of Claims, citing Paul v. United States, has gone to the extent of

reading into a government Capehart Housing Act contract a standard-form military
article providing for termination for the convenience of the government even though
the contract did not include it, and even though the court admitted that the Armed
Services Procurement Act did not cover the subject. Judge Davis stated for the
court in G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States," that ". . . a grant of wide
and general authority to contract and procure will extend to all reasonable phases
and methods"; and he also cited Priebe & Sons v. United States for the proposition

that "The power to purchase on appropriate terms and conditions is, of course, inferred from every power to purchase. ' 7 This language, too, is the language of Mr.
Justice Douglas; but its use in the case appears strangely out of context, for in Priebe
the Supreme Court struck down an attempt on the part of procurement officials of
one federal agency to provide for liquidated damages which, under the circumstances
involved, were held to amount to penalties :8
We are pointed, however, to no provision by which the Congress authorized the imposition of penalties as sanctions to that [Lend-Lease] program; nor do we find any. We
cannot infer such a power. The power to purchase on appropriate terms and conditions
is, of course, inferred from every power to purchase. But if that is the source of con-

gressional authority to impose penalties, then any procurement officer, in war or in peace,
could impose them. That is contrary to all our decisions on this question which involve
government contracts.
The Court of Claims, however, is of the opinion that it may infer power in the
Department of Defense to promulgate termination conditions from its grant of broad
and general authority to contract. And because the Department has incorporated
such conditions into a regulation which has the force of law, they may be read
into a government procurement contract as if they were the words of a statute. But
would the decision have been different in Priebe, if prior to writing the contract,

the Lend-Lease Agency had adopted a regulation providing for penalties under the
label "liquidated damages"?
8320

F.2d 345, 348 (963), cert. denied, 75 U.S. 954 (x963), rehearingdenied, 376 U.S. 929 (x964).

id. at 348.

Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 413 (947).
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II
DOUGLAS AND THE SUPREME COURT OPPOSITION

No one will argue with Mr. justice Stewart's pronouncement for the minority l
Paul v. United States:9
I do not doubt that Congress in the exercise of its war power could by virtue of the
supremacy clause provide that an otherwise valid state law affecting the price of milk
shall not apply to milk purchased with federal funds for use at these military installations.
°
"An unexpressed purpose
He then goes on to cite the majority in Penn Dairies:"
of Congress to set aside statutes of the states regulating their internal affairs is not
lightly to be inferred and ought not to be implied where the legislative command,
read in the light of history, remains ambiguous." Here the argument begins, on the
part of Justice Douglas. Yet the gist of the thought sounds peculiarly like that of
Douglas in Priebe. But Justice Douglas, although he discusses it in two paragraphs,
does not rely on a specific statutory change by Congress, nor a clear legislative history;
and he is not concerned with the problem of a state law imposing direct restraints
upon a vital federal function, as in the California Commission case." How then did
he find a change in federal policy? By the change in the ASPR, which "has, of
course, the force of law." Justice Stewart points this out when he says: "While the
Court's opinion discusses this legislative history, I read the opinion as resting primarily on the Court's reading of certain executive regulations issued under the
authority of the procurement law."'"
Chief Justice Stone, in Penn Dairies,made two observations about Army regulations (which subsequently became War Department regulations) on state pricefixing laws:"S

The statutes authorizing the Secretary of War "to prescribe rules and regulations to be
observed in the preparation and submission and opening of bids for contracts under the
War Department," . . . give no hint of any delegation to the Secretary or his subordinates
to do what Congress failed to do-restrict the application of local regulations, otherwise
applicable to government contractors, which increase price. And the regulation itself is
at most a direction to contracting officers not to assume by their specifications for bids
any responsibility for requiring compliance with local price regulations before it is
judicially determined whether such regulations are applicable to government contracts.
III
THE SuPREME COURT's TWENTY YEAR SwiTcH
Justice Douglas does not, however, feel it necessary to overrule Penn Dairies;he
distinguishes it on the grounds of changed conditions. He says that Congress, by
371 U.S. 245, 270 (1963).
10318 U.S. 261, 275 (1943).
11355 U.S. 534 (1958).
"Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 275, 282 (1963).
in38 U.S. 26r, 276-77.
l
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passing the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, has revised the federal procurement policy; presumably by re-emphasizing the "time-tested method of competitive
procurement," it has now authorized administrative officials to restrict the application
of local regulations which are in conflict. And secondly, the agency involved, now
the Department of Defense, has issued a specific implementing regulation under the
1947 statute.
The dissent elaborates on the difficulty of basing a finding of a changed federal
policy on the provisions of the act or the legislative history. It is undeniable that, if
the act re-emphasizes competitive procurement, it also has deeply imbedded in it
substantial exceptions. In fact, Justice Douglas, apart from explaining away a subsequent amendment to the act, devotes most of his argument and places his reliance
on the second aspect-the changed regulation.
It is ironic that Justice Douglas has to rely upon Department of Defense regulations to bolster and clarify a congressional policy of competitive bidding, for it is
undoubtedly true that in practice breach of this policy has sometimes taken place.
Perhaps "breach" is not the proper word, for the act itself provides for exceptions
upon proper findings and determinations of procuring agencies, or during a
national emergency declared by Congress or the President.14 Most people do not
realize how long we have been living in this state of presidentially declared
emergency; 15 but anyone in day-to-day contact with government procurement, both
in and out of the Department of Defense, knows of the possibility that the facts of
procurement may be bent and twisted to allow for a finding and determination to
avoid the competitive process.
Of course, the existence of this possibility may be justified on a principle of
expediency-the argument being made that, if the time were taken to advertise
or solicit proposals for every procurement susceptible to competition, we would
never have closed the ballistic missile gap or would never put a man on the moon.
This argument, and the statistics which arose from it,1" primarily led to the
1962 amendment of the Armed Services Procurement Act by Congress."7 Thus
i 1o

U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1958).

"5 The Korean national emergency proclamation of President Truman was declared on Dec. 16, i95o
and is still in effect despite attempts to terminate it. Cf. H.R. 5532, and xo8 CONG. REC. 9234 (1962).
"oThe floor leader of H.R. 5532, Congressman Hebert, stated: "In the latest six-month reporting
period, 87 per cent contract dollars were handled by negotiation . . . only 13 per cent of purchasing
is now done by sealed competitive bidding. That is clearly not enough." zo8 CONG. REC. 9234 (x962).
In" 1955 and 1956 the percentage was 94.19 per cent of the defense procurement dollar negotiated,
representing $34 billion as against $2 billion purchased by advertised competitive procurement. Id. at 9242.
"'The bill as passed was Pub. Law No. 87-653, 76 Stat. 528, 1o U.S.C.A. § 2304 (963).
It is inieresting to note the remarks of Congressman Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee,
on the necessity of incorporating a certificate-of-accurate-costs requirement in the bill:
"In fact, a provision for a certificate of accurate costs was put in the Armed Services Procurement
Regulation after our hearings. It has been there for over two years.
"That requirement is set out in section 3-807.3 and the form of the certificate is prescribed in section
3.807.7.

"I submit that if it is a good regulation, it will be a good law.
"The reason for putting this provision in the law is to have the requirement followed.

When it is

TiE MLKMAN RINGS TwIcE

Justice Douglas found support for the federal policy in what the Department of
Defense says (as he interprets the regulation), rather than in the practice reflected by
procurement statistics.
A further irony is that Justice Douglas now requires application of the policy of
competition in one of the few fields where a genuine exception to that policy (other
than expediency, based on a saving of time and personnel, which is, of course, not
officially recognized) might reasonably exist. Douglas recognizes this himself by
saying in his decision in Paul that policy-wise it might be better if federal procurement officials honored the state price-fixing systems. Does this mean that the
procuring agency has the discretion to determine, reverse, or waive federal policy?
Suppose the ASPR were now changed to provide for honoring state price-fixing laws
in the procurement of milk at commissaries. In the face of the decision in Paul,
could the Comptroller General allow payment on such contracts?
IV
IMPLICATIONS OF PAUL V. UNITED STATES

Finding congressional intent is not always easy; and to a certain extent the administrative agencies, like the courts, legislate interstitially. Between Penn Dairies and
Paul, the Supreme Court, with an administrative agency assist, became willing to

infer (or as Chief Justice Stone would have said, "infer lightly") the intent of
Congress. The fact that the Court was willing to do this in Paul and relied so
heavily on the ASPR in so doing-rather than relying on the direct restraints to which
a vital federal function had been subjected by the conflicting local statutes, as in the
California Commission case-gives greater significance now to the statement that
regulations have the force of law. Of course, Justice Douglas said the same thing in
the California Commission case; but as Justice Stewart points out in Paul,' the

Court did not really rely on that proposition then as it does now. 9
Perhaps the more basic explanation of the Supreme Court's switch in policy within
twenty years to allow federal procurement regulations to override state price-fixing
laws without concern for their impact or lack of impact on vital federal functions
lies in the increased influence of Justice Douglas and his personal philosophy on the
law, no contract will be enforceable without it. That is the point to which we have come today." io8
CoNG. REc. 9237 (1962).
"SPaul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 272 (1963):
"The opinion in the California Commission case also discussed the 1947 Armed Services Procurement
Act, but nowhere suggested that the 1947 Act had changed the law upon which the decision in Penn
Dairies had rested. Rather the Court distinguished the Penn Dairies case on the ground that the
Pennsylvania milk marketing statute had not subjected the National Government or its officers to any
direct restraints, as did the California legislation." (Footnotes omitted.)
"SIn a similar way in Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942), cited by justice Douglas
as authority in his dissent in Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 265 (943), the statement
of the Court ". . . that the establishment and control of post exchanges have been in accordance with
regulations rather than specific statutory directions does not alter their status, for War Department regulations have the force of law . . ." (36 U.S. at 484) is not the true holding of the Court, but is used as
an ancillary argument to the decision that post exchanges are arms of the government, and share its
immunities.
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Court.2 0 Justice Douglas, as an acknowledged expert in the field of the national
economy by reason of his experience in teaching business law at the Yale Law School
and as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission prior to coming to
the Court in 1939,21 frequently writes the opinion of the Court in the field of federal
procurement. The difficulty with his highly individualistic opinions lies in the subsequent application of them by those who must rely on the Supreme Court's decisions
and apply them in later cases. This warrants a detailed analysis of past opinions
referring to regulations having the force of law (particularly those of Justice Douglas),
as well as those subsequent to the decision in Paul v. United States.
V
SCOPE OF ADMINISTRATIvE RULE-MAKING

Assuming, although Douglas never said it in so many words, that Paul means
that an administrative agency my infer congressional intent from an ambiguous
legislative history and bolster that intent by its implementing regulations, the question
is then raised: "Do these regulations have the full force of statutory law?" And
where the congressional act has been silent, but the administrative agency has interstitially legislated, based on its broad and general rule-making authority, do these
regulations equally have the full force of statutory law?
The general rule on the force and effect of an administrative regulation is well
set forth in another case discussing the ASPR, United States v. Barnard:2
It is the well settled rule of law that a regulation promulgated by an administrative agency
charged with administration of an act has the force and effect of law if it is reasonably
adapted to the administration and enforcement of the act and does not contravene some
statutory provision.
However, the general rule is subject to many refinements and exceptions, three of
which are set forth in the dissent in Paul.2" As American Jurisprudence, in discussing the scope of powers granted to an administrative agency, states: 24
'0 Time, Aug. 23, 1963, p. 17, states: "As the Court now stands, the usual fivc-mcmbcr majority
(consisting of Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Hugo Black, William Douglas, William Brennan, Jr.,
and Arthur Goldberg) is characterized as 'liberal.' The four member minority (Justices Tom Clark,
John Marshall Harlan, Potter Stewart, and Byron White) is called 'conservative' . . . that difference (between liberal and conservative), of course, lies in the conflict between the liberal notion that the Supreme
Court should interpret the law according to the individual, often individualistic, sense of justice and injustice of its members, and the conservative proposition that Supreme Court decisions must be limited
by the constitutional and legislative laws of the land."
" Cf. Casper, The Liberal Faith: Some Observations on the Legal Philosophy of Mr. Justice William
0. Douglas, 22 FED. B. J. 179, 189 (1962). He states:
"The problem of the time was the creation of a strong, eflicient, well-balanced national economy.
Justice Douglas answered this challenge, as the professor and the administrator had answered it before.
"The legal philosophy and method applied in the decision-making of these years was basically that of
legal realism. That is, an attempt was made to ascertain the social and economic facts of the day before
passing judgment on what was considered to be the public interest."
22 255 F.2d 583, 588-89 (ioth Cir. 1958) (citing cases), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 979 (1958).
53 371 U.S. 246, 270 e t seq. (1963).
24 42 Am. JuR. Pub. Admin. Law § 53 (1942).
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Since the power to make regulations is administrative in nature, legislation may not be
enacted under the guise of its exercise by issuing a "regulation" which is out of harmony
with, or which alters, extends or limits the statute being administered, or which is inconsistent with the expression of the lawmakers' intent in other statutes.... The [administrative officer] cannot initiate policy in the true sense, but must fundamentally
pursue a policy predetermined by the same power from which he derives his authority.
If the regulations go beyond what Congress can authorize or beyond what it has
authorized, they are void and may be disregarded 5 Regulations of a department
must be issued within the powers conferred by Congress and must be addressed
to and reasonably adapted to the enforcement of an act of Congress2
Even in the field of the interpretation of Internal Revenue Regulations, where the
Supreme Court gives great weight to a long established construction of tax laws by
administrative action, it does not grant them the full force of statutory law.
And it is said that while no provision of the statute authorizes a specific regulation
respecting this matter, the general power conferred by law to make appropriate regulations comprehends the subject. Where the act uses ambiguous terms, or is of a doubtful
construction, a clarifying regulation or one indicating the method of its application to
specific cases not only is permissible but is to be given great weight by the courts.
And the same principle governs where the statute merely expresses a general rule
and invests the Secretary of the Treasury with authority to promulgate regulations
27
appropriate to its enforcement.
Departmental regulations may not invade the field of legislation, but must be confined within the limits of congressional enactment.2 s The distinction between regula29
tory and statutory law was well stated as far back as 1897 in Meads v.United States:
"It is very true that these regulations duly promulgated by the department have the
force of law, in a limited and just sense, especially when authorized or approved by
Congress."

vI
Is SPECIFIC STATUTORY AuTHORITY NECFssARY?

The Court of Claims in Christian has now interpreted Paul v. United States to
mean that (mandatory?) regulations have the full force of statutory law, so as to
allow their incorporation in a contract otherwise silent. It has also held that no
specific statutory authority or legislative history is required to obtain this effect.
Judge Davis stated:" ° "Unless the Congress has prohibited the agency from entering
some phase of the contractual process (or using some otherwise lawful method of
contracting), a grant of wide and general authority to contract and procure will
extend to all reasonable phases and methods." It seems doubtful that Justice Douglas
5

" Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 4ro (917).
Kirk v. United States, 270 F.2d izo (gth Cir. 1959), citing 91 C.J.S. United States § 31

20

= Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446-47 (1936).
sHawke v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, io9 F.2d 946 ( 9 th Cir. 1940).
8i Fed. 684, 694 (6th Cir. 1897). (Emphasis added.)
8'
1o 320 F.zd 345, 348. (Emphasis added.)

955).
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intended such an extension of his statement that regulations have the force of law.
In fact, he had already spoken on this very subject that was before the Court of
1
Claims, in a concurring opinion in United States v. Penn Foundry & Mfg. Co., IncP
In this case involving termination by the Navy Department of a Letter of Intent, the
Supreme Court refused to allow the contractor to recover for anticipated profits due
to failure of proof, and in his concurring opinion Justice Douglas, joined by three
other Justices, stated that the contractor could have recovered had it presented
sufficient evidence to overcome the Navy's general policy of incorporating termination clauses in the resulting formal contracts prohibiting such recovery. "Respondent,
however, has not carried the burden of showing that it would have been saved from
the application of that policy" 32 But in a footnote the statutory authority was
33
pointed out:
At that time Title II of the First War Powers Act . . .was in effect empowering the
President to authorize any department or agency exercising functions in connection with
the prosecution of the war effort under regulations prescribed by him "to enter into
contracts and into amendments or modifications of contracts heretofore or hereafter made
..without regard to the provisions of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts whenever he deems such action would facilitate the
prosecution of the war ... "
In all the cases cited by Judge Davis for support,34 however (with the exception
of Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock35), the Court relied upon, or at least referred to,
congressional intent as contained in more or less specific statutory language dealing
with the subject at issue. Judge Davis admits that termination for convenience
authority is no longer covered by "... the generous umbrella of Tide II of the First
31337 U.S. z98 (x949).
"I1d.
8

at 216.

1d. at 215 n.4 (citing First War Powers Act, § 2o, 55 Stat. 839, 50 U.S.C. § 61x (z958)).
"'Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. zo, 114 ff. (1954); Public Utilities Comm'n of
California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958); Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (3963); United
States v. Penn Foundry & Mfg. Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 198 (949) (opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas).
" There is always a tax case which is the exception that proves the rule. In Kern-Limeric, supra
note 34, at i6, the Court held: "We find nothing in the Procurement Act that bars a contract for purchase
for the United States of supplies or services by private persons."
"The Government asserts that §§ 4(a) and 4 (b) authorize this contract. Under them, negotiated contracts such as this 'may be of any type which ... will promote the best interests of the Government.' Under such a provision, it seems that the determination to use purchasing agents is permissible. Where there
is no prohibition of a particular type of contract and no direction to use a particular type, the contracting
officers are free to follow business practices." Id. at zz6.
It is interesting to note that Justice Black, along with Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Douglas, who,
are now normally aligned with the majority bloc of the Court, dissented on this very point:
"The Court holds that Government purchasing agents can delegate to their subordinates authority to
delegate to private persons power to buy goods for the Government and pledge its credit to pay for them.
Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 13 (1941), rejected a similar contention. The Court points to
no statute which either expressly or by fair implication grants any such broad delegation authority to
Government agents." Id. at 123.
In view of this dissent and the present constitution of the Supreme Court, the authority of this case is
dubious. Although the "agency" theory has come under much criticism in Congress, there has been no
legislation enacted to date. Cf. DA PAMPHLET 27-153, PROCUREMENT LAW 305 (i96i).
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War Powers Act of December 18, 1941 ... ." This therefore forces him to rely on
broad and general powers, and to take the previously quoted sentence of Priebe
entirely out of context.
VII
TiE PRACTICAL PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING REGULATIONS

Nevertheless, it might be argued that the Court of Claims in Christianis allowing
the Department of Defense to do exactly what the Supreme Court allowed it to do
in Paul-infer the intent of Congress, or, in the absence thereof, interstitially to
legislate the policy. But to then go on and incorporate these regulations "by
operation of law," just as though they were based on a clearly stated statute, leads
only to creating more problems than it settles.
The problems are inherent in the existence of the multitudinous federal procurement agencies. The NASA, for example, is brought under the purview of the
Armed Services Procurement Act by section 3 oi(b) of Public Law 85-568; but the
agency interprets this statute to include only the act and not the regulations issued
pursuant thereto, since its basic statute 6 has the same broad and general authority
that exists under the Armed Services Procurement Act. How this works out is
revealed in the very area of Christian. The NASA interpretation in the area of
conflict between the mandatory clauses of the ASPR and specific contractual provisions on termination is that the clauses used in the contract will control the regulation. 7 Now, if the ASPR is the supreme law of the land and its application is made
mandatory, it would appear that this NASA regulation is in contravention thereof
and must fall. One way out of this dilemma is to say that each agency is supreme
in its own contractual relations and that by administrative agreement they will follow
common policy to the extent each sees fit. But there is a third horn to this dilemma,
because Congress has specifically directed by amendment 8 to the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act of I949"° that each federal agency shall utilize
such uniform standardized forms and procedures as are prescribed by the Administrator of General Services, except as the Administrator shall otherwise provide.
The General Services Administrator has seen fit by Federal Procurement Regulation
X-I.004 to exclude the Department of Defense from the mandatory provisions of the
Federal Procurement Regulation "except for standard government forms and clauses,
Federal Specifications and Standards, and except as directed by the President, Congress, or other authority . . . ." This, too, was accomplished by administrative
agreement. The intended result is described in a report by General Services Administration, prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Government Operations:40
" National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-.568, 72 Stat. 426, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2451 (1958).

"'National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Procurement Regulation 8.ooo(b).
88 66 Star. 593 (1952), 40 U.S.C.A.

§ 487 (x963).

g 63 Star. 393 (1949), as amended, 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 25x-6o (1963).
oGeneral Services Administration, Report, S. RP. No. -, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (959).
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The authority to standardize Government purchase and contract forms, procedures
and specifications has been in effect and in use for many years and is demanded by industry to make its relations with the Government easier. It is confusing and costly, for
example, to have a contract with terms, forms, and conditions for a supply item with one
agency differing in meaning and effect from one for the same kind of item with another
agency ....
The Comptroller General recently ruled on a conflict in regard to a standard
clause for consideration of late bids 1 Not only did a conflict exist between the
Federal Procurement Regulation and the ASPR, but also within various sections
of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation itself. The Comptroller General
held that the Federal Procurement Regulation clause ".

.

. is a standard clause

which by law and regulations is prescribed for use by all federal agencies including
the Department of Defense ...although use of that clause was not compulsory
until January 2, 1963." Effective February A8, 1963, the Department of Defense

'4 2
amended its policy regulations to prevent a conflict with the ASPR "late bids"
clause, but the Armed Services Procurement Regulation still clearly is in conflict with
the FPR policy in this field.

VIII
LEGALITY As DISTINGUISHED FRoM PoLicy-DOUGLAS'S VIEWS
In the decision denying a rehearing in Christian, Judge Davis said that the Court
was not concerned with whether the policy of incorporation by regulation is the
best policy in this matter; its only concern was with the legality of this incorporation.
He cited Justice Douglas in Paul to establish that administrative regulations have

the force of law, and Justice Douglas in Penn Foundries for the view that policy
provisions need not be spelled out in a contract. He also cited Justice Douglas in
Priebe concerning the extent of the broad powers granted in the general power to
contract.

Mr. Justice Douglas himself stated in Paulthat the Court was not concerned with
the appropriateness of a policy but with what the policy was. Although, in effect,
inferring the intent of Congress from the implementing administrative regulations,
he did not omit the step of referring to the congressional intent as revealed by legislative history. Neither did he in Penn Foundries omit that step; again he referred
to the legislative background. But the place where he has most clearly indicated
that congressional approval cannot be wholly inferred, just because it has granted
broad general powers and has not disapproved the policy promulgated, is in Priebe.
There, as has been previously mentioned, Judge Davis seems to have quoted him
wholly out of context. The case itself is, of course, distinguishable on other grounds
-that the clause involved was deemed violative of general contract law. But then
changing or adding to specific contract terms so as to eliminate proven anticipated
B-15o54, March 22, 1963, 42 Comp. Gen. -.
"Armed .Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) 2-,o3.2, 32 .CF.R. § 2.303-2 (1963).
"See
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profits upon breach of contract produces a result not obtainable under general
contract law4 and therefore before sanctioning such a change "congressional purpose
should be plain.""

Ix
A

REASONABLE AND LEGAL POLICY

Would it not be more reasonable to say that, where Congress has not indicated
a clear intent, each agency is authorized to regulate its own activities and its regulations will be binding on its own members; however, they will be binding as to third
parties only to the extent that those parties agree to them by contract? This is the
well established construction of section twenty-two of Tide Five- (general authority
to the head of each department to ". . . prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with
law, for the government of his department . . .").45Of course, in this case the
statutory language lends itself to this construction.
Once we agree on the principle that for a regulation to have the full force of
statutory law it must be promulgated pursuant to a clearly stated congressional policy,
then we can agree with the further argument advanced by Judge Davis on the
rehearing in Christian that subordinates cannot be allowed to sap regulations issued
by superiors. But to apply that policy to all the varying regulations, or even to just
the standard or mandatory regulations, issued by the multitudinous procurement
agencies would lead only to the confusion already mentioned. It might also lead to
contractors' demanding of every contracting officer that he show specific authority for
entering into each and every contract. If the rule in Christian were applied widely,
the present contracting officer's warrant to enter into contracts would not be of much
value.
In these days of growing detailed supervision of contracts and subcontracts by
government procurement officials, the contractor more and more seeks special
language in his contract varying in one degree or another from standard terminology
or "boiler plate." As Judge Davis indicated, if these are recognized deviations, then
a procedure exists for obtaining approval from superior authority. But what if in
good faith the contracting officer, exercising what was theretofore thought to be his
discretion, determines that the changed language is not a true deviation and does not
forward it to headquarters, hoping thereby to avoid that bugaboo of all procurement
officials-delay?
It would indeed be unfortunate if, in these days of demand for streamlined
"As established by United States v. Behan, 1i1 U.S. 338 (1884).
"De Laval Steam Turbine Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 61 (93), emphasizes the reliance upon
statutory authority (Act of June 15, 1917, par. I, 40 Star. 182) to the President based upon wartime conditions. Cf. Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, :261 .US. 514 (1923).
" Cf. 17 Ops. ArY. GEN. 524 (1883), cited in notes to 5 U.S.C.A. § 22 (1963):
"No authority is created by this section which enables the heads of departments to make rules for the
conduct of persons not connected with the departments, but such regulations, when made, are exclusively
for the government of the department, and the conduct of its officers, and the preservation of the papers
and property belonging to the department.".
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procurement methods to allow us to reach national prestige objectives on schedule,
the contracting officer were forced to wait for headquarters' approval of every
change in standard clauses for fear that it later may be held to be a deviation from
an administrative regulation which "has the force of law." Neither Justice Douglas
nor the Supreme Court in Paul v. United States ever intended that result.
EPILOGUE

Now, nine months after the writing of the original article, and more than a year
after the decision in Paul v. United States, was handed down, can we say with
assurance that federal procurement regulations "have, of course, the force of [statutory] law"? In order to demonstrate that the unqualified use of that proposition on
occasion even "sticks in the craw" of the Court of Claims, it is illuminating to
examine two decisions handed down by the court on December 13, 1963-the Gold47
wasser case,46 and the Reiner case
These cases both involved the applicability of the termination for convenience
dause, which was contained in the contracts. I submit that whether the clause was
in the contract or not is immaterial if procurement regulations (which provided
the same thing) have the full force of law. If the court really accepts that proposition,
then there should be no argument about applicability. The Supreme Court in
College Point Boat Co. v. United States," decided that when Congress had passed
a statute authorizing termination for the convenience of the government there was an
unqualified right in the government to cancel or terminate at any time. In other
words, if the authority to terminate for the convenience of the government is contained in a regulation which has the force of statutory law, then the parties are held
to have contemplated it, whether in the contract or not. But the majority of the
court in Goldwasser fell back on its 1961 decision in Klein v. United States,49 and held
that where no previous attempt had been made to terminate for convenience, the
government could not fall back upon a right which existed but was never asserted
until it was found to be in breach of contract. They said "it would be anomalous
indeed if it could," which must mean it offends their sense of justice in this case.
But on the same day, it handed down the Reiner decision, in which the majority
of the court applied the termination for convenience clause after the fact although
they disagreed on the reasons therefor. The rationale of the court shows the confusion which results from equating regulations (or clauses) which do not have
statutory authority with those which do. We can all agree that the government
is different from a private contractor, and that there are circumstances when the
best interests of the government give it the right to terminate for convenience.
But it does not seem equitable to allow an administrative agency to arrogate to
"Goldwasser v. United States, 325 F.2d 722 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
'" John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. x963).
"267 U.S. 12 (1925).

49 285 F.2d 778 (Ct.'CI. g6i).
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itself the right to avoid a wrongful breach of contract, whether committed intentionally or not, and whether by means of contract clause or regulation, in violation of general contract law. The determination of the proper circumstances should
be made by the Congress, or else the authority should be by clear legislative grant.
If one can reconcile and harmonize these decisions he may know the true
answer to the question which I originally asked. For he will be a procurement
expert. And we all know an expert is a man who makes mistakes with confidence.
I, like most people who have helped to write regulations, have no more confidence
in the force of procurement regulations now than I did before. In that respect I am
like my old chief in the Air Force Space Systems Division. Once, upon my return
from discussing with headquarters a contract negotiation, I said that I hesitated to
tell him what happened for fear that he would lose confidence in us. His reply was:
"That's all right. You can go ahead and tell me. I never had any confidence in you
in the first place."
The truth is that the continued use of Justice Douglas' proposition in the way it
has been applied since G. L. Christian & Associates serves only to thicken what
some of our distinguished jurists have termed the "administrative fog." The administrative agencies continue to arrogate authority to themselves, and to issue regulations to implement that authority. Although the Department of Defense has
attempted to clear the fog by abolishing separate procurement regulations for its
separate services, it is to be noted that they have only succeeded in clearing a small
hole in the fog. Concurrently with the Department of Defense action, the Commerce Clearing House felt obliged to create a new volume to accommodate the
multitude of procurement regulations newly issued by the other governmental
agencies involved in procurement. And the regulations do not all say the same
thing-sometimes by design, and sometimes purely by accident. If they all "have,
of course, the force of law," the government contractor has a terrible burden
to bear. He is presumed not only to know all the statutory law, but also all the
diverse regulations. He must not only make sure that the contract says what he
wants it to, but that the contracting officer did not make any mistake.
Up to the time of the G. L. Christian & Associates decision, the contractors
could at the negotiation table refuse to accept certain clauses in their contracts or,
more usually, they could write in schedule provisions which could be interpreted
to cover their views in those areas while leaving the general provisions unchanged.
Then they could argue that if there was any conflict the special provisions overrode
the general.
Now in these days when the long arm of the government is reaching further and
further into the areas in which contractor management feels it has some prerogatives,
such as sub-contract management and the extent of allowable technical direction,
there seems to be no way out other than by the contractor insisting on headquarters
approval of any significant schedule provisions as well as the "boiler plate."
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For both legal and policy reasons the Court of Claims should limit the effect
of the G. L. Christian & Associates decision strictly to its special facts. If not,
then I support in principle the efforts of the attorney for Christian & Associates in
what he has described as his third bite at the Supreme Court by way of certiorari.
Maybe then Justice Douglas will explain that he did not mean that federal procurement regulations "have, of course, the force of law," in an unqualified sense.

